Gambling-Related Distortions and Problem Gambling in Adolescents: A Model to Explain Mechanisms and Develop Interventions by Donati, Maria Anna et al.
fpsyg-08-02243 December 29, 2017 Time: 18:23 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 05 January 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02243
Edited by:
Xavier Noel,
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Reviewed by:
Celine Baeyens,
Université Grenoble Alpes, France
Jeffrey L. Derevensky,
McGill University, Canada
*Correspondence:
Maria Anna Donati
mariaanna.donati@unifi.it
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Psychopathology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 21 February 2017
Accepted: 11 December 2017
Published: 05 January 2018
Citation:
Donati MA, Chiesi F, Iozzi A,
Manfredi A, Fagni F and Primi C
(2018) Gambling-Related Distortions
and Problem Gambling
in Adolescents: A Model to Explain
Mechanisms and Develop
Interventions. Front. Psychol. 8:2243.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02243
Gambling-Related Distortions and
Problem Gambling in Adolescents:
A Model to Explain Mechanisms and
Develop Interventions
Maria Anna Donati1* , Francesca Chiesi1, Adriana Iozzi2, Antonella Manfredi3,
Fabrizio Fagni4 and Caterina Primi1
1 Department of Neurofarba, University of Florence, Florence, Italy, 2 UFC SerD Zona 1 Firenze, Azienda USL Toscana
Centro, Florence, Italy, 3 Area Dipendenze, Azienda USL Toscana Centro, Florence, Italy, 4 UFC SerD Pistoia-Valdinievole,
Azienda USL Toscana Centro, Florence, Italy
Although a number of gambling preventive initiatives have been realized with
adolescents, many of them have been developed in absence of a clear and explicitly
described theoretical model. The present work was aimed to analyze the adequacy of
a model to explain gambling behavior referring to gambling-related cognitive distortions
(Study 1), and to verify the effectiveness of a preventive intervention developed on the
basis of this model (Study 2). Following dual-process theories on cognitive functioning,
in Study 1 we tested a model in which mindware gap, i.e., susceptibility to the gambler’s
fallacy, and contaminated mindware, i.e., superstitious thinking, were the antecedents
of gambling-related cognitive distortions that, in turn, affect gambling frequency and
problem gambling. Participants were 306 male adolescents (Mage = 17.2 years). A path
analysis indicated that cognitive distortions have a mediating role in the relationship that
links probabilistic reasoning fallacy and superstitious thinking with problem gambling.
Following these findings, in Study 2 we developed a school-based intervention aimed
to reduce gambling-related cognitive distortions acting on the above cited mindware
problems. A pre- and post-test design – with a 6 months follow-up – was performed
with 34 male adolescents (Mage = 16.8), randomly assigned to two groups (Training and
No Training), and their baseline equivalence was verified. A Mixed 2× 2 ANOVA attested
a significant Time X Group interaction, indicating a significant reduction of the cognitive
distortions from pre-test to post-test only in the Training group. The follow-up attested
to the stability of the training effects and the reduction of gambling frequency over time.
These findings suggest that prevention strategies should address mindware problems,
which can be considered as predictors of gambling-related cognitive distortions.
Keywords: gambling, prevention, adolescents, gambling-related cognitive distortions, mindware, gambler’s
fallacy, superstitious thinking
INTRODUCTION
Despite the restrictions to gamble for youth, prevalence studies report that a large number of
adolescents are involved in gambling activities and that they are at higher risk for developing
gambling problems compared to adults (see Blinn-Pike et al., 2010; Volberg et al., 2010, for
reviews). There are alarming data as initiation of gambling at an early age is associated with a
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higher risk of more severe gambling problems in adulthood
(Johansson et al., 2009; Granero et al., 2014). Due to the potential
negative consequences derived from gambling, prevention of
problem gambling among adolescents has increasingly become
an important area of concern in research and practice. For this
reason, several educational initiatives have been realized (see
Ladouceur et al., 2013; St-Pierre et al., 2015; Keen et al., 2016,
for reviews). However, many of them have been developed in
absence of an explicitly described theoretical model (Ladouceur
et al., 2013; St-Pierre et al., 2015) and, even when a theoretical
model has been proposed, it was adapted from other addictions’
prevention approaches or it is often unclear how the theory was
used in the program development (St-Pierre et al., 2015).
Following this premise, the goal of the present work was
to fill this gap through two studies. In Study 1, we aimed
to test a theoretically grounded model to explain gambling
frequency and problem gambling referring to gambling-related
cognitive distortions, i.e., a wide array of mistaken beliefs and
perceptions about gambling (Raylu and Oei, 2004; Johansson
et al., 2009). Then, in Study 2, we aimed to develop and verify the
effectiveness of a preventive intervention focused on gambling-
related cognitive distortions based on the model tested in Study 1.
STUDY 1
Referring to research with adults, dual-process theories on
cognitive functioning have been used to explain cognitive failure
that leads to persistent gambling behavior (Toplak et al., 2007).
These theories distinguish between autonomous sets of systems
(rapid, automatic, parallel, and heuristic) and analytic cognitive
processes (slow, under control, serial, and rule-based) (see
Stanovich, 2004, for a review). Toplak et al. (2007) used this
model to explain how people tend to be irrational while gambling.
Particularly, they considered problems regarding mindware
(Perkins, 1995), defined as the rules, procedures, and strategies
derived from past learning experiences and available for explicit
retrieval. The authors stated that mindware problems can arise
when there is a mindware gap or in the case of contaminated
mindware. Specifically, there is a mindware gap when the
appropriate rules, procedures, and strategies are lacking, while a
contaminated mindware verifies when the employed mindware
is not helpful in the specific situation. Referring to gambling, to
operationalize the mindware gap, they referred to probabilistic
reasoning ability in a variety of heuristic and bias problems
and they proposed the disposition to believe in paranormal
events, superstition, and luck to operationalize the contaminated
mindware.
On one hand, a mindware gap in probabilistic reasoning,
intended as the ability to draw conclusions about the likelihood
of events based on available information or personal knowledge
or beliefs, could have an important role in gambling. Indeed,
it has been suggested that misunderstanding of probability can
lead to irrational thoughts and behaviors related to gambling,
such as chasing or obtaining false contingencies (Raylu and
Oei, 2004). As reviewed by Goodie and Fortune (2013),
misrepresentations about the chance of winning can derive from
the representativeness heuristic, i.e., a tendency for people to
base their judgment of the probability of a particular event
on how much it represents the essential features of the parent
population or of its generating process (Kahneman et al., 1982),
and associated biases. For instance, one of the most documented
biases related to gambling is the gambler’s fallacy, which occurs
when individuals believe that even short strings of random
events must correspond with their perception of what constitutes
randomness, leading to beliefs that particular outcomes are “due”
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971).
On the other hand, a contaminated mindware as superstitious
thinking, i.e., the propensity of having beliefs based on perceiving
biased casual relationships between unrelated events (Ninness
and Ninness, 1998), can be related to distortions about gambling.
Superstition, which appears during childhood and adolescence
(Chiesi et al., 2010), is a thinking disposition that can affect
reasoning regardless of cognitive abilities (Sá et al., 2005; West
et al., 2008). Research and practice with adult pathological
gamblers have shown that they have behavioral superstitions in
which they associate certain habits with positive gambling results,
cognitive superstitions in which they associate specific thought
processes with winning, or talismanic superstitions in which they
associate good luck charms with winning (Toneatto, 1999).
Taken together, mindware gap and contaminated mindware,
as defined inside the above described dual-process framework,
can provide an explanation for the mechanisms under which
gambling-related cognitive distortions arise. These distortions,
e.g., mistaken perceptions of the role of personal ability in
gambling, misrepresentations of the chances of winning, false
beliefs about the possibility to control or predict gambling
outcomes, are deemed important risk factors for pathological
gambling in both adults and adolescents. Indeed, high levels of
cognitive distortions have been found to be associated with high
levels of gambling frequency and to play an important role in
the development of problem gambling in adults (Raylu and Oei,
2004; Arcan and Karanci, 2015; see Fortune and Goodie, 2012, for
a review). Consistently, cognitive distortions related to gambling
predict the frequency of gambling (Donati et al., 2015) and are
strong predictors of problem gambling among adolescents (e.g.,
Taylor et al., 2014; Cosenza and Nigro, 2015; Donati et al., 2015).
Following these premises, we aimed to test a model in
which susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy (mindware gap)
and superstitious thinking (contaminated mindware) were
associated with gambling frequency and problem gambling
through gambling-related cognitive distortions. Indeed, given
the importance of cognitive distortions in relation to gambling
behavior, it becomes relevant to investigate their possible
antecedents in young people. To the best of our knowledge,
there are few studies on this topic and, in particular, there is
a lack of studies attesting empirically the relationship between
probabilistic reasoning and superstition to gambling-related
cognitive distortions among adolescents.
We hypothesized that higher susceptibility to the gambler’s
fallacy and higher superstitious thinking would be related to
higher gambling-related erroneous cognitions. Moreover, since
both susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy and superstitious
thinking have been found to be related to gambling behavior
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among adolescents (e.g., Skoukaskas and Satkeviciute, 2007;
Delfabbro et al., 2009; Chiu and Storm, 2010; Donati et al., 2013),
we predicted that cognitive distortions related to gambling would
mediate the relationship between susceptibility to the gambler’s
fallacy and superstitious thinking with gambling frequency and
problem gambling. Furthermore, as the frequency of gambling
has been found to be linked to the number of problem gambling
symptoms (Chiu and Storm, 2010; Derevensky et al., 2010), we
predicted that gambling-related cognitive distortions would affect
problem gambling also indirectly through gambling frequency.
Finally, as probabilistic reasoning biases have been found to be
related to superstition (e.g., Kokis et al., 2002; Chiesi et al., 2010),
we hypothesized a positive correlation between susceptibility to
the gambler’s fallacy and superstitious thinking.
Methods
Participants
Participants included 306 male adolescents (Mage = 17.2 years,
SD = 1.5, range: 14–24) who attended high school in Italy
(Tuscany). In line with some studies (e.g., Vitaro et al., 2004;
Ricijas et al., 2016), we recruited only boys. Indeed, despite
the expansion of the gambling industry has modified the male-
dominated gambling culture (Dowling, 2013), gender differences
in gambling behavior have been reported, indicating that boys are
more likely than girls to gamble and to report gambling problems
(see Splevins et al., 2010; Calado et al., 2016, for reviews). Written
informed assent was provided by students and by the parents if
the student was a minor.
Measures and Procedure
To measure susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy, the Gambler’s
Fallacy Task (GFT, Primi and Chiesi, 2011) was used. It consists
of a marble bag game in which participants were asked which
outcome was more likely at the next draw after a sequence of
five equal outcomes (five blue or five green marbles). In more
detail, the task was composed of three different trials in which
the proportion of Blue and Green marbles in the bag varied
(first trial: 15B and 15G; second trial: 10B and 20G; third trial:
25B and 5G). In total, each participant answered six questions.
Summing fallacious answers, we computed a gambler’s fallacy
score ranging from 0 to 6, with higher scores corresponding to
higher susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy.
To measure superstitious thinking, the Superstitious Thinking
Scale (STS, Kokis et al., 2002; Italian version: Chiesi et al., 2010)
was used. It is composed of eight Likert-type items using a
5-point scale ranging from totally false to totally true, yielding
a maximum score of 40. Higher scores represent high levels of
superstitious thinking. An example of an item is “The number
13 is unlucky”. Coefficient alpha for the current sample was
satisfactory (α= 0.77).
The Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS; Raylu and
Oei, 2004; Italian version: Iliceto et al., 2015) is a self-report
scale to assess gambling-related cognitions. It contains twenty-
three Likert-type items (using a 7-point scale ranging from
strongly disagree to strongly agree) related to five biases regarding
gambling measured by the following subscales: Gambling
Expectancies (4 items; e.g., “Having a gamble helps reduce tension
and stress”), Illusion of Control (4 items; e.g., “Specific numbers
and colors can help increase my chances of winning”), Predictive
Control (6 items; e.g., “When I have a win once, I will definitely
win again”), Inability to Stop Gambling (5 items; e.g., “It is
difficult to stop gambling as I am so out of control”), and
Interpretative Bias (4 items; e.g., “Relating my losses to bad luck
and bad circumstances makes me continue gambling”). The scale
was previously found to have adequate validity and reliability
among adolescents (e.g., Taylor et al., 2014; Donati et al., 2015).
The coefficient alpha for the current sample was satisfactory
(α = 0.89). The GRCS subscale scores as well as the GRCS
total score, obtained by summing the score for each item, were
calculated. However, following the suggestion that only the total
score for the GRCS should be used with adolescents (Taylor et al.,
2014), the total score was used in the path model.
Gambling behavior was measured through the South Oaks
Gambling Screen-Revised for Adolescents (SOGS-RA; Winters
et al., 1993; Italian version: Colasante et al., 2014). This is one
of the most widely instrument to measure problem gambling
with adolescents (see Edgren et al., 2016, for a review), and its
effectiveness has been attested by applying Item Response Theory
(Chiesi et al., 2013). The scale is composed of two sections using
the last year gambling behavior. In the first one, participants were
asked to indicate the frequency of gambling (Never = 0, Less
Than Monthly = 1, Monthly = 2, Weekly = 3, and Daily = 4)
among a list of eleven gambling activities including: Playing cards
for money, coin tosses for money, bets on games of personal
skill, bets on sports teams, bets on horse or dog races, bingo,
dice games for money, slot machines, scratch-cards, lotteries, and
on-line games. Considering responses to this section, participants
can be classified into non-gamblers (no gambling behavior) and
gamblers (gambling on at least one activity) (Welte et al., 2009).
Moreover, among gamblers, non-regular gamblers (i.e., those
who participated from less than monthly to less than weekly
in at least one gambling activity) and regular gamblers (i.e.,
those who participated weekly or daily in at least one gambling
activity) can be identified (Winters et al., 1993). Finally, a total
score of gambling frequency (range: 0–44) can be obtained by
summing the responses for each gambling activity (Wickwire
et al., 2007). The second section consists of 12 items related to
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (III
edition revised) criteria for pathological gambling (American
Psychiatric Association, 1987). An example is: “In the past 12
months, how often have you gone back another day to try to
win back money that you lost?”. All items require dichotomous
answers (i.e., yes or no) except the first item, which has a
4-point response scale (never, some of the time, most of the
time, every time), and it is dichotomized (i.e., never/some of
the time or most of the time/every time) in the scoring phase.
A single composite score was computed summing the responses
for each item of the second section. The total SOGS-RA score,
indicative of the number of problem gambling symptoms, was
used as dependent variable (range: 0–12), in line with previous
studies (e.g., Wickwire et al., 2007, 2010). Finally, according to
the narrow criterion (Winters et al., 1995), different categories
of gamblers were identified: Non-problem gamblers (i.e., SOGS-
RA scores from 0 to 1), at-risk gamblers (i.e., SOGS-RA scores
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for gambler’s fallacy, superstitious thinking, gambling-related cognitive distortions – the GRCS total score and the subscale scores – and
problem gambling for non-regular gamblers (n = 86) and Regular gamblers (n = 168).
Type of gamblers based upon
gambling frequency
Dependent variable Non-regular Regular t (df) p Cohen’s d
gamblers M (SD) gamblers M (SD)
Gambler’s fallacy 4.56 (1.73) 5.19 (1.44) −2.74 (252) <0.01 0.40
Superstitious thinking 18.49 (6.25) 21.36 (7.10) −3.30 (252) <0.01 0.43
Gambling related cognitive distortions – Total score 35.68 (12.31) 48.66 (20.36) −6.32 (252) <0.001 0.77
Gambling Expectancies 5.39 (2.08) 8.55 (4.64) −7.49 (252) <0.001 0.88
Illusion of Control 5.35 (2.50) 7.07 (3.99) −4.20 (252) <0.001 0.70
Predictive Control 11.65 (5.67) 14.42 (6.36) −3.53 (252) <0.001 0.46
Inability to Stop Gambling 6.54 (2.68) 8.46 (2.57) −3.87 (252) <0.001 0.73
Interpretative Bias 6.75 (3.75) 10.16 (5.44) −5.86 (252) <0.001 0.73
Problem gambling 0.60 (1.06) 1.81 (2.07) −6.20 (252) <0.001 0.74
from 2 to 3), and problem gamblers (i.e., SOGS-RA scores of 4 or
more).
The above-described scales were administered in the
classrooms and students were required to work individually.
Teachers were not present during the administration of the
scales, which required approximately 40 min.
Results
Results showed that 16% of the participants had never gambled.
Then, we performed the analyses on adolescent gamblers, i.e.,
the 254 respondents who affirmed having gambled at least
once during the last year. Among them, 66% were non-regular
gamblers (n = 86), and 34% were regular gamblers (n = 168).
The most common activities were scratch-cards (74%), sport bets
(62%), and cards for money (47%), while the least engaged in
activities were dice games for money (7%), bets on coin tosses
(8%), and bets on horse or dog races (9%). Considering the
score of the second section of the SOGS-RA, 75% (n = 190)
of the respondents were non-problem gamblers, 19% (n = 48)
at-risk gamblers, and 6% (n = 16) problem gamblers. Descriptive
statistics of GFT, STS, GRCS, and the SOGS-RA based upon
gambling frequency are displayed in Table 1, while descriptive
statistics of the scales for the entire sample are reported in
Table 2.
As reported in Table 1, results showed that regular gamblers
were more susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy, had higher levels of
superstitious thinking and gambling related cognitive distortions,
and reported more problem gambling symptoms than non-
regular gamblers.
Then, we computed Pearson correlations to investigate the
relationships among susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy,
superstitious thinking, gambling-related cognitive distortions –
the GRCS total score and the subscale scores-, gambling
frequency, and problem gambling.
As shown in Table 2, gambling-related cognitive distortions
were significantly and positively correlated both with
susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy and superstitious thinking.
In detail, with the exception of Interpretative Bias, all the
five cognitive distortions were related to susceptibility to the
gambler’s fallacy and superstitious thinking, especially Illusion
of Control, which shows, respectively, moderate and high
correlations with the two variables. In addition, gambling-related
cognitive distortions were significantly and positively correlated
both with gambling frequency and problem gambling. Looking at
GRCS subscales correlations, results indicated moderate and high
correlations, with the highest between gambling frequency and
Gambling Expectancies, while, Inability to Stop Gambling showed
the highest Pearson coefficient value in the association with
problem gambling. The results also showed that susceptibility to
the gambler’s fallacy was significantly and positively correlated
with superstitious thinking, and both these variables were
significantly and positively correlated with gambling frequency.
The correlations between problem gambling were not significant.
Finally, gambling frequency resulted to be significantly and
positively correlated with problem gambling.
To investigate our hypothesis on the mechanisms underlying
the relationships among these variables, we conducted a path
analysis with AMOS using maximum likelihood estimation. The
model included susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy and
superstitious thinking as gambling-related cognitions’
antecedents, and gambling-related cognitive distortions as
antecedents of gambling frequency and problem gambling,
which was directly affected by gambling frequency (Figure 1).
Several goodness-of-fit indices were used to test the adequacy
of the model: The Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990),
the Tuker-Lewis index (TLI; Tucker and Lewis, 1973), and the
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger and
Lind, 1980). CFI and TLI values equal to.90 or greater (Tucker
and Lewis, 1973; Bentler, 1990) and RMSEA values of.08 or
below (Steiger and Lind, 1980) were considered as indices of
adequate fit.
The hypothesized model showed a good fit to the data
(CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.07). All coefficients
were statistically significant and in the expected directions.
Specifically, results revealed that susceptibility to the gambler’s
fallacy and superstitious thinking had significant direct
positive effects on gambling-related cognitive distortions.
Gambling-related cognitive distortions were directly and
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positively related to gambling frequency as well as problem
gambling, and gambling frequency had a direct positive
effect on problem gambling. Moreover, both susceptibility
to the gambler’s fallacy and superstitious thinking had
significant indirect effects on gambling frequency, respectively
0.09 (p < 0.01) and 0.12 (p < 0.01), and on problem
gambling, respectively 0.10 (p < 0.01) and 0.13 (p < 0.01).
A significant indirect effect of 0.18 (p < 0.01) was also
found between gambling-related cognitions and problem
gambling Finally, a significant positive covariation was found
between susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy and superstitious
thinking.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to test the adequacy of a
model explaining the relationship between susceptibility to
the gambler’s fallacy, superstitious thinking, gambling-related
cognitive distortions, and gambling behavior among adolescents.
In line with the predictions, findings revealed that the tendency
to commit the gambler’s fallacy and to be superstitious affects
distorted cognitions about gambling. More specifically, higher
susceptibility to commit the gambler’s fallacy and higher
superstitious thinking were related to greater levels of gambling-
related cognitive distortions. Moreover, our model showed that
cognitive distortions on gambling mediate the relationship
between susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy and superstitious
thinking with gambling behavior.
From a theoretical point of view, our findings confirm that
there may be a cognitive-psychological mechanism through
which faulty beliefs about gambling develop. In particular, results
are consistent with Toplak et al.’s (2007) suggestions about
the existence of two cognitive processes that affect problematic
gambling behavior in adults–following a dual-process perspective
on cognitive functioning (Stanovich, 2004)– i.e., difficulties in
dealing with probability (mindware gap) and belief in superstition
and luck (contaminated mindware).
Compared to previous research with adolescents, our study
expands the current knowledge by suggesting that gambler’s
fallacy and superstitious thinking are related to gambling-related
distortions in adolescence. Furthermore, this study suggests that
the relationship between gambler’s fallacy and problem gambling
(e.g., Skoukaskas and Satkeviciute, 2007; Delfabbro et al., 2009;
Donati et al., 2013), and the association of superstitious thinking
with problem gambling (e.g., Chiu and Storm, 2010; Donati et al.,
2013) can be explained by taking into account the mediating
role of gambling-related cognitive distortions. In other words,
adolescents more prone to mistaken perceptions of probability
and with the tendency to adhere to superstitious beliefs are
susceptible to cognitive distortions related to gambling. As such,
they are particularly at risk since they have a greater likelihood
of gambling with high frequency and developing gambling
problems.
Although this model has been verified with a relatively small
number of adolescent male gamblers, practical implications can
be derived from the study. Indeed, our model can represent
a theoretical based framework from which developing theory-
driven interventions oriented to youth. Specifically, focusing on
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FIGURE 1 | Model of problem gambling with standardized parameters (significant path coefficient ∗∗∗ at the 0.001 level, ∗∗ at the 0.01 level). Dotted lines represent
indirect effects, while continuous lines indicate direct effects.
these findings, a program aimed to modify gambling-related
cognitive distortions can be developed. This was the aim of
Study 2.
STUDY 2
Among the guidelines published by the Society for Prevention
Research for the development of effective preventive
interventions (Flay et al., 2005), there is the desirable standard
that a clear theory of causal mechanism of the change promoted
by the intervention should be stated. In particular, it would
be important that the preventive program would be informed
by theory and prior empirical analyses on antecedents and
predictors of outcomes. Indeed, the systematic reviews conducted
on the preventive interventions developed with adolescents in
the school setting (Ladouceur et al., 2013; St-Pierre et al.,
2015; Keen et al., 2016) agree in recognizing that many of the
existing prevention programs have been developed in absence
of a clear theoretical framework describing the expected causal
mechanisms by which the programs would exert their effect.
Following this premise, once tested the adequacy of our model
on gambling in Study 1, the goal of Study 2 was to develop
and verify the effectiveness of a universal preventive intervention
addressed to general samples of youth, regardless of risk or
gambling status (Ladouceur et al., 2013; Keen et al., 2016) aimed
to reduce gambling-related cognitive distortions by acting on
probabilistic reasoning errors (mindware gap) and superstitious
thinking (contaminated mindware). Additionally, moving from
the theoretical guideline for which the main purpose of any
prevention program should be to reduce the incidence of the
potential problem (Ladouceur et al., 2013), we aimed to obtain
behavioral changes related to gambling frequency, which is
an antecedent of problem gambling (Chiu and Storm, 2010;
Derevensky et al., 2010). Finally, due the “preventive” nature
of the current intervention, reducing the incidence of problem
gambling was outside our goals. In sum, following St-Pierre
et al.’s (2015) classification framework, we developed a “gambling-
specific psychoeducational and skills training prevention program”
to reduce the erroneous cognitions on gambling acting on
gambling-related knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and skills as well
as the awareness about the nature of gambling, knowing that all
these factors may impact on adolescents’ gambling habits.
In evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed intervention,
we also wanted to take into account some relevant
methodological issues. First of all, although a short-term
change of gambling-erroneous cognitions have been obtained in
several of these preventive initiatives (e.g., Ferland et al., 2002,
2005; Capitanucci et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2010; Donati
et al., 2014; Huic et al., 2017), only few of them verified the
stability of these effects over time (Gaboury and Ladouceur,
1993; Capitanucci et al., 2010; Donati et al., 2014). Thus, to
provide evidence of the strength and stability of the change in the
current intervention program, we assessed the short-term and
long-term effects on gambling-related cognitions and also the
long-term effects on gambling behavior. Secondly, we employed
scales (i.e., SOGS-RA, GRCS, GFT, and STS) that were previously
analyzed for their psychometric properties (see Study 1 for
a detailed description). Indeed, the majority of the gambling
intervention programs have not used psychometrically good
measurement instruments to assess the variables of interest
despite their obvious necessity (Ladouceur et al., 2013). Finally,
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we employed an experimental design in which we verified the
baseline equivalence of the experimental group and control
group for the targeted variables of our intervention. Even in this
case, with few exceptions (Williams et al., 2010; Donati et al.,
2014), the baseline equivalence between the experimental and
control groups has not been tested in past studies.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 34 male high school students (Mage = 16.80,
SD = 1.04, range: 15–19) enrolled in a public high school in
Tuscany (Italy). From the available schools in the area, one school
was randomly selected. Subsequently, the school’s principal was
contacted, apprised of the issue of adolescent problem gambling
to generate support for the research, and he was presented with
the project. Once the school agreed to participate, the detailed
study protocol was approved by the institutional review board
of the school. Written informed consent was requested from
students (or their parents, if they were minors), assuring them
that the data would be handled confidentially. The research
was conducted during school time and all students invited to
participate agreed to do so. We chose a specific sample as it seems
pertinent to deliver interventions to small groups of students that
are homogenous in terms of risk factors, gambling habits, gender,
and age (Ladouceur et al., 2013).
Measures
In line with Study 1, participants were administered the GFT, the
STS, the GRCS, and the SOGS-RA (see Study 1 for description
and scoring).
Procedure and Design
To evaluate changes in the dimensions considered in the
study over time as a function of treatment condition, an
experimental design was conducted with two groups (Training
vs. No Training) and three measurements (pre-test, post-test,
and follow-up sessions). Classes were randomly assigned to
the Training and No Training conditions. The Training group
consisted of 16 students (Mage = 16.99, SD = 1.20) and the
No Training group consisted of 18 students (Mage = 16.63,
SD = 0.89). For the Training group, participation involved
filling out the above described scales before the intervention
(pre-test), receiving training activities, filling out the GRCS
after intervention (post-test), and then compiling the GRCS
and the SOGS-RA six months (school break over the summer
occurred during this interval) after the intervention has ended
(follow-up). The pre-test, post-test, and follow-up questionnaires
were administered also to the No Training group. Nevertheless,
while the Training group received the intervention, the No
Training group continued with usual school activity.
In the pre-test, post-test, and follow-up sessions, the scales
were administered within the classrooms, and students were
required to work individually. Teachers were not present
during the administration of the scales. Administration of the
instruments required approximately 40 min for the pre-test
session, 15 min for the post-test session, and 25 min for the
follow-up session. The Training group attended the intervention
approximately 2 weeks after the pre-test, and the post-test was
administrated 1 week after the end of the intervention and
5 weeks after pre-test data were collected. Few days after the
follow-up session, a final meeting took place during which all
the participants were given a feedback about the research and
thanked for their participation.
The Intervention
Our intervention activities were based upon the model tested
in Study 1. In detail, as cognitive distortions on gambling are
affected by problems regarding mindware gap, i.e., probabilistic
reasoning errors, and contaminated mindware, i.e., superstitious
thinking, we wanted to implement activities in which adolescents
could reinforce their ability to recognize biases in reasoning
with randomness and could reflect about the irrationality of
superstitions. Specifically, as for the mindware gap, activities
focused on: Randomness with a series of coin tosses, independent
random events employing a 40 cards desk, independence with
equally likely and non-equally likely events represented with
different colored paper sheets, gambler’s fallacy in no-gambling
and gambling contexts, and probabilistic reasoning in fictitious
gambling situations. Regarding the contaminated mindware,
participants were told about the superstition meaning and
the lack of cause-effect relationship between a supposed event
bringing bad or good luck and the supposed positive or
negative event occurred referring to common superstitions.
Then, referring more specifically to the relationship between
superstition and gambling, several examples were presented
about susceptibility to superstitious conditioning in gambling
activities and the absence of a causal relationship between
superstitious thoughts (e.g., the belief in lucky numbers) and
gambling outcomes.
Concerning the training techniques, we integrated a mixed set
of techniques including activities with random events generators,
Power-Point presentations, and collective discussions. As for the
methodology, each didactic unit included exercises in which
students had to apply the learned ability/concept, and then they
had to use the learned ability referring to fictitious gambling
situations. In that way, training activities were aimed to promote
the generalization of the proposed contents in real-life contexts.
Concerning the procedure, each activity was implemented
using a specific sequence: Initial instructions by the trainer,
running the activity by the students, interactive discussion and
synthesis of the contents, delivery of summary sheets to the
students.
The intervention included two didactic units implemented
in class, during the normal school time conducted by a
developmental psychologist expert in the field of adolescent
gambling research with a couple of operators belonging to the
addiction unit of the socio-territorial service. Teachers were not
present during the administration of the training program. Each
didactic unit lasted about 2 h and were presented in a 2 week
period (one per week).
Results
Results showed that 85% of the participants (n = 29)
affirmed having gambled at least once during the last year.
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Among them, 76% were non-regular gamblers, and 24% were
regular gamblers. The most common activities were scratch-
tickets (62%), sport bets (41%), and cards for money (23%).
Considering the score of the second section of the SOGS-RA,
81% (n = 23) of the respondents were non-problem gamblers,
12% (n = 4) at-risk gamblers, and 6% (n = 2) problem
gamblers.
Preliminarily, we tested the baseline equivalence of the
Training and No Training groups for age and the targeted
variables of our intervention. No significant differences were
found between the two groups concerning age (p = 0.316),
susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy (p = 0.111), and
superstitious thinking (p = 0.661). Then, we analyzed the
short-term efficacy of the intervention conducting a Mixed
2 × 2 ANOVA with Time (pre- and post-test) as within
factor, Group (Training and No Training) as between factor,
and gambling-related cognitive distortions as dependent
variable.
A significant Time × Group interaction was found
[F(1,32) = 4.25, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.117]. Post hoc t-tests
showed the interaction effects to be due to significant changes
from pre-test to post-test in the Training group but not in the
No Training group. Specifically, in the Training group there was
a significant reduction of gambling-related cognitive distortions
[t(15) = 2.78, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.69) from pre-test
(M = 37.31, SD = 17.53) to post-test (M = 25.88, SD = 5.25),
while no significant changes occurred in the No Training
group [t(17) = −0.61, p = 0.552] from pre-test (M = 37.61,
SD= 10.95) to post-test (M = 41.11, SD= 26.43). Moreover, the
two groups resulted to be significantly different for gambling-
related cognitive distortions at the post-test [t(32) = −2.26,
p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.80]. The Training group resulted to have
lower levels of erroneous cognitions about gambling compared
with the No Training group, while at the pre-test they have an
equivalent level (Figure 2).
To verify the stability of the short-term effects over time, for
the Training participants, we compared post-test and follow-up
scores of gambling-related cognitive distortions. In detail, using
paired t-tests, we compared post-test scores with the follow-up
ones. Results showed no significant differences [t(15)=−0.29,
p = 0.780] suggesting the permanence of the intervention
effects over time for gambling-related cognitive distortions from
post-test (M = 25.88, SD = 5.25) to follow-up (M = 26.31,
SD= 6.66).
Subsequently, to verify whether the intervention had a
decrementing effect on adolescent self-reported gambling
behavior, a Mixed 2 × 2 ANOVA with Time (pre- and
follow-up) as within factor, Group (Training and No Training)
as between factor, and gambling frequency as dependent
variable, was conducted. A non-significant Time × Group
interaction was found [F(1,32) = 1.70, p = 0.201]. Nonetheless,
since the sample size was small and important effect might
be non-significant (i.e., Type II errors might be made), we
looked at the effect size (η2p = 0.05), which suggested that
a small effect was obtained. As such, post hoc t-tests showed
significant changes from pre- to follow-up in the Training
group but not in the No Training group. Specifically, in
the Training group there was a significant and medium size
change of gambling frequency [t(15) = 2.95, p < 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.73], suggesting a reduction of gambling frequency from
pre-test (M = 3.69, SD = 4.96) to follow-up (M = 1.50,
SD = 2.53). On the contrary, no significant changes occurred
in the No Training group [t(17) = 0.04, p = 0.969] from
pre-test (M = 3.94, SD = 4.45) to follow-up (M = 3.89,
SD= 5.22).
Discussion
Following the results of Study 1, the aim of the present study
was to develop and evaluate a preventive intervention which
would be able to modify erroneous cognitions about gambling
by acting on probabilistic reasoning biases (mindware gap)
and superstitious thinking (contaminated mindware). Findings
showed that the intervention produced the hypothesized effects
in the short-term as participants who attended the training
program reduced their gambling-related cognitive distortions,
while the participants who did not follow the training program
FIGURE 2 | Gambling-related cognitive distortions by Time (pre-test and post-test) and group (Training and No Training). ∗p < 0.05.
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did not show a significant change from pre-test to post-
test. This finding is of particular importance since research
has generally provided evidence of a resistance to change for
probabilistic reasoning biases (for a summary of the literature,
see e.g., Gilovich et al., 2002; specifically, for adolescents, see
Klaczynski, 2004). Additionally, the above described short-term
results for gambling erroneous distortions were found to be
stable after 6 months by the end of the intervention (i.e.,
the post-test mean scores did not differ significantly from the
follow-up), indicating a substantial persistence of the effects over
a period of six months for participants attending the training
program.
Concerning the effects on gambling behavior, whereas
some previous studies reported no behavioral changes despite
improvements in knowledge and the reduction of cognitive
errors (Gaboury and Ladouceur, 1993; Ferland et al., 2005;
Turner et al., 2008; Huic et al., 2017), some changes were
produced in gambling behavior. Specifically, in line with
previous studies (Williams, 2002; Donati et al., 2014) we
observed that only adolescents who attended the training
program reduce their gambling frequency from pre-test to
follow-up.
Finally, the methodological strengths of the current study,
i.e., having tested short-and long-term effect of the intervention,
having used effective instruments to measure the variables of
interest, and having tested the baseline equivalence of the
experimental and control group, attest to the worth and utility
of the proposed intervention.
In sum, the current study provided evidence about the
effectiveness of an intervention based upon an evidence-based
theoretical model referring to the dual-process theoretical
framework.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The systematic reviews (Ladouceur et al., 2013; St-Pierre
et al., 2015; Keen et al., 2016) conducted on the preventive
interventions developed with adolescents in the school setting
agree in recognizing that many of the existing prevention
programs have been developed in absence of a clear theoretical
framework describing the expected causal mechanisms by
which the programs would exert their effect. Overcoming the
limitations of the previous studies, this work proposed and tested
the effectiveness of a gambling preventive intervention with
adolescents after having previously verified the adequacy of a
theoretical model explaining adolescent gambling involvement.
With respect to the application of dual-process theories
on cognitive functioning in the prediction of gambling
behavior (Toplak et al., 2007), our model proposed that
susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy and superstitious thinking
(respectively, mindware gap and contaminated mindware,
according to the dual-process theory) were the predictor
variables of gambling-related distorted cognitions in adolescence,
while gambling frequency and problem gambling were the
outcome variables. This study supports the results suggested
by Clark (2010) that the high propensity for individuals
commit mistakes in reasoning and judgment makes them
particularly vulnerable to adhere and maintain cognitive
distortions related to gambling. With specific reference to
the practical implications of the model, our results provided
a theoretically grounded model useful not only to explain
gambling-related cognitions but also to develop interventions to
modify them.
More broadly speaking, this work showed that dual-process
theory of cognition (see Evans and Stanovich, 2013; for a
review) can be used as conceptual framework to explain
and prevent gambling behavior in adolescence. There have
been only few attempts to apply it to adolescents, with few
exceptions (see Klaczynski, 2004, for the employment of this
theory to explain adolescent social and cognitive development),
and little research has been conducted in order to investigate
its application in the field of adolescent health behavior.
Nevertheless, it has been suggested the utility of dual-process
theories in explaining and predicting many types of health
behaviors in adolescence as they involve both analytic and
heuristics processing (Gibbons et al., 2009). Thus, the present
studies provided some empirical support about the applicability
of dual-process theories to explain and modify gambling-
related erroneous cognition and gambling behavior, in some
extent. More in detail, the intervention we developed following
the dual-process model resulted was effective in reducing
gambling-related erroneous cognitions in the short-term and
in producing a stable change of these cognitions in the long-
term. Additionally, there was a transfer of learning about
gambling-related cognitions onto gambling behavior resulting in
a reduction of gambling frequency after six months by the end
of the intervention. Nonetheless, the medium effect size of this
difference confirms the existing difficulties in changing gambling
behavior among adolescents through educational interventions
(Keen et al., 2016).
Concerning this point, the effectiveness of this intervention
in reducing an important risk factor for maladaptive gambling
behavior (i.e., gambling-erroneous cognitions) is very important
as it has been showed that preventive programs that obtain
change in risk and protective factors are more successful
than programs showing behavior change (Foxcroft and
Tsertsvadze, 2012). Moreover, these kind of programs focused
on changing specific correlates of maladaptive gambling
behavior may have effects that extend to other health behaviors
(Hawkins et al., 2015).
Whereas this work has a number of strengths, including the
evaluation of a theoretical model then linked to a gambling
preventive intervention, and the use of good psychometric
instruments, there are some limitations to take into account.
First, as our work was conducted with boys attending
Italian public high school, caution has to be paid about the
generalizability of the present results. Future studies should be
conducted in order to test the adequacy of the theoretical model
with broader samples of adolescents, for instance including also
girls. Moreover, although the descriptive data about gambling
behavior were in line with previous data with adolescent males
(e.g., Gupta et al., 2004; Olason et al., 2006), the small number
of participants in Study 2 limits the impact of the current
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results concerning the developed preventive intervention. Future
studies should be conducted with wider samples in order
to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention based on
gambling behavior and severity. Finally, as research indicates
that various and different factors increase the likelihood
of problem gambling in adolescents (e.g., Donati et al.,
2013; Cosenza and Nigro, 2015), it should be important
to investigate theoretical models taking into account other
variables in addition to susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy
and superstitious thinking as predictors of gambling-erroneous
cognitions.
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